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In Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology
between
Induction,
Deduction
and
Assertion
(http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/2/417.full.pdf), Stefan Talmon
revisits the old debate over inductive and deductive methods for finding
customary international law (CIL) to see whether we can now, fifty years
after the original debates, learn any lessons about whether, when, and
how the International Court of Justice uses each. What Talmon finds is
that there are no clear patterns in how the ICJ uses each method, and that
in fact, it is a third method, assertion, that best exemplifies the Court’s
approach. What Talmon only hints at though are much broader lessons—
that the ICJ’s failure to adopt a clear methodology for finding customary
international law is only a symptom of a much broader problem, that the
ICJ has never articulated a clear, coherent explanation of its authority to
interpret customary international law or for whom. The ICJ’s efforts to
find customary international law may simply be incoherent, a mirage, or
even impossible.
The questions that Talmon’s study begs are why. Why isn’t the ICJ more
interested in developing a clear methodology and why are there no
patterns in the ICJ’s use of deductive or inductive methods? And why
aren’t states more concerned? Why haven’t states demanded a clear
methodology before treating ICJ decisions on custom as authoritative?
Methodology as Justification
Starting with the first question, the lack of clear methodology hints that
the ICJ’s choice of induction, deduction, or assertion has little to do with
methodology and everything to do with justification. When the Court
invokes each one, it is attempting to justify its authority to interpret or
find rules of CIL. Assertion makes this clearest—in the absence of any
real evidence of a customary rule, the Court justifies it rules with appeals
to “obviousness.” As Talmon wisely observes, both inductive and
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deductive methods are claims of derivative authority—the Court is not
“making” or “choosing” a rule, but merely “finding” the rule made by
states themselves in their interaction with one another. This is true
whether the Court counts practice and weighs opinio juris or attempts to
deduce a specific rule from recognized more general ones. It also tracks
the
requirement
of
article
38
of
the
ICJ
Statute
(http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/sicj/icj_statute_e.pdf) that the Court apply
“international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law.”
In essence, the Court‘s claim is that it is simply stepping into the shoes of
states and making the same judgment they would make about specific
rules and actions.
Negotiated Law and Adjudicated Law
The problem reflected in the ICJ’s methodological muddle is that this task
may be impossible and the justification something of a fib. A court cannot

Subscribe to EJIL: Talk! for
email updates
Email *

Subscribe!

Recent Comments
EJIL: Talk! – Strange Angel:
Some Reflections on War
{
[…] certainty of value based in

step into a state’s shoes. A court forced to find a rule to decide a case is
engaged in a fundamentally different activity than a state discerning a rule
to guide its actions or jockeying for its favoured interpretation in relations
with other states. As I explain in greater depth in International Law’s Erie
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Moment (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141773),
states and courts are engaged in two entirely different forms of
lawmaking that operate differently, instantiate different values, and derive
legitimacy from different sources. Customary international law imagines
a specific model of lawmaking, what I refer to as “Negotiated law,” in
which states develop the law through their regular interactions. It

Marty Lederman Joost,
Lilliana: Well, *that* was close!:
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/12/the
lastminutecorrectiontoparis.html
– Dec 14

imagines a constant backandforth, in which the meaning of the rules are
discussed, debated, and fought over. Ambiguity and flexibility are
features of Negotiated law rather than bugs; they encourage renegotiation
and learning through practical experience. And the legitimacy of the rules
that emerge from Negotiated law is supported by values of consent,
compromise, and pragmatism. Courts face a very different task. The goal
of “Adjudicated law” is to resolve ambiguity, to find with certainty for
one party or the other. Justice rather than pragmatism is the goal. And
whether using deductive or inductive logic, it is logic and reasoned
elaboration, not jawboning, that is the valued method of interpretation.
Adjudicated law accordingly derives authority from different sources of
legitimacy—delegation, expertise, neutrality, reasoning, and finality.
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These differences between adjudicated law and negotiated law complicate
the transposition of rules from one context to other. The development of
“custom” via adjudication is not just a continuation of that rule’s
development, but its transformation into something new.
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But the differences between Negotiated and Adjudicated law could
largely be ignored when judgments of international courts were rare and
ad hoc. The realization that the two forms of lawmaking are somewhat at
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odds may have inspired the drafters of the statutes of the Permanent Court
of International Justice and ICJ to make those courts’ decisions binding
only in specific cases and to relegate precedents to a secondary role in
others. Essentially, states demanded that courts, as best as possible,
decide cases based on what states had done or decided; the Court is asked
to approximate what states would themselves perceive the law to be in
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their interactions with one another. In turn, the legitimacy of the ICJ’s
decisions would be based on its ability to accurately reflect the results of
state practice and will. And because of the impossibility of capturing
those perfectly, states were only willing to accept the ICJ’s authority to
translate Negotiated law into Adjudicated law for specific cases. They
were not willing to give up the flexibility built into Negotiated law
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entirely. States would take the ICJ’s view into account in their continuing
dialectic on custom, but the ICJ’s view had no authority to supercede that
dialectic.
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Two developments upended that understanding. First, as Talmon
explains, almost inevitably, the ICJ was asked to decide questions that
state practice could not definitely answer; standing in the shoes of states
would be, at best, a guess. Shifting from inductive to deductive methods,
and eventually to assertion, reflects a continued desire to use the same
derivative legitimacy—the Court wasn’t doing anything that needed to be
legitimated; it was only discerning the will of states embodied in existing
Negotiated law. Whether using inductive or deductive logics though, this
charade was somewhat hard to maintain. The Court was engaged in
making Adjudicated law, which needed to be legitimated in its own way.
Second, international court decisions became more common, both at the
ICJ and elsewhere. The increasing density of adjudication had system
effects for the relevance of ICJ decisions. An ICJ opinion on CIL might
be cabined to a dispute when adjudication was relatively rare, but in a
denser ecosystem of courts in which adjudication is frequent, it becomes
impossible. Courts looking for rules of CIL now have the ICJ’s “clear”
opinion alongside less than clear state practice and opinio juris. The ICJ’s
and other courts’ opinions become new baselines against which future
analyses of CIL take place. Whether desired or not (and there were
backers of the PCIJ and ICJ from the beginning who did so desire), a
system of precedent emerged (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2419706).
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The development of precedent upends the compromise implied in the ICJ
statute (Adjudicated law threatens to replace Negotiated law entirely) and
puts much greater pressure on the ICJ to legitimate its decisions on the
content of CIL. But while some states have pushed back against this
emerging
system
of
precedent
in
some
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1514410) contexts
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(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141773)), the ICJ
has refused to legitimate it or to develop its own account of its authority
to develop international law. Instead, it has hewed to methods—
induction, deduction, or assertion—that continually reassert the Court’s
authority as merely derivative. Where the use of those methods is
unconvincing, it merely evidences the lie that Adjudicated law and
Negotiated law are the same and that the Court solely applies the rules
developed by states.

This then returns us to my second original question: why haven’t states
demanded that the ICJ develop a clear methodology for finding rules of
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CIL? States could make a clear methodology a sin qua non of bringing
cases and accepting jurisdiction. The fact that they haven’t suggests that
they don’t necessarily want one. Why not? In any given case, there is a
strong chance that deductive and inductive methods will support different
answers, and states will likely prefer one method to another in a particular
case. Across issues and time though, states have a multitude of positions
on customary international law, some of which will be strengthened by
appeals to state practice and others by appeals to logic. While allowing
the ICJ to fudge a bit on methodology might worry states, particularly if
ICJ opinions are likely to have precedential effect, that methodological
fudge also guarantees that the room for states to continue debating custom
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will remain. And states may realize that an ICJ methodology risks
becoming a CIL methodology more broadly. The ICJ may have an
outsize ability to freeze a fluid debate over a particular custom; it might
be worse, for states, if it could freeze the methodology for finding custom
generally, which would threaten to disrupt the entire Negotiated law
project of customary international lawmaking and its backandforth
parrying. In turn, the possibility that states prefer the flexibility of
methodological uncertainty over tying the ICJ’s hands suggests lessons
not only for the ICJ, but for projects, like the International Law
Commission’s, to codify the meaning and processes of CIL more broadly.
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